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Perhaps it is unfair of me to quote this short extract 
from a much larger argument out of context. While it 
has the virtue of representing a position with which I 
wish to take issue, abstracting it from the context of the 
nuanced and leisurely argument that Perry Nodelman 
makes in The Hidden Adult or even from the context 
of the essay by him that inspired this forum threatens 
to reduce the statement to a convenient straw figure. 
Furthermore, I have a great deal of respect for Perry 
Nodelman; I have been reading his work since the mid-
1980s, when, as a graduate student, I accidentally but 
happily stumbled into the field of children’s literature 
studies. Then the editor of Children’s Literature 
Association Quarterly, Nodelman was instrumental 
in helping to define that field. Nevertheless, nearly 
thirty years later in a review essay in Jeunesse, in 
which I reviewed The Hidden Adult in conjunction 
with several volumes of Nodelman’s children’s fiction, 
I began to delineate some problems I have with his 
“taxonomy of children’s literature” (“Ambivalent” 140). 
My primary objection, as I hope to make clear in the 
remainder of this essay, is to Nodelman’s premise that 
“[T]he characteristic markers of children’s literature ‘are all variants of and manifestations of the 
basic opposition between adult and child implied by the very circumstance of adults writing for 
children.’”
 –Perry Nodelman, “Discovery: My Name Is Elizabeth” (51), quoting Nodelman, The 
Hidden Adult (249)
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“the very circumstance of writing for children” implies 
“a basic opposition between adult and child” (Hidden 
249; emphasis added). This premise, which underlies 
the arguments in The Hidden Adult, overemphasizes 
both the alterity of children and the separation of adult 
literature from children’s literature. In so doing, it serves 
to perpetuate the idea, famously expressed by Jacqueline 
Rose, that children’s fiction “sets up a world in which 
the adult comes first (author, maker, giver) and the child 
comes after (reader, product, receiver), but where neither 
of them enter the space in between” (1–2).
In several earlier essays leading up to and 
including my review essay on Nodelman’s work, I 
have suggested that the opposition between adults 
and children is not so stark and that a once-useful 
hermeneutics of suspicion has devolved into a series 
of increasingly rote critical gestures that border on 
the clichéd.1 I see these automatic critical gestures 
implicated in an overemphasis on children’s alterity, 
in a model of children as helpless or even as victims, 
implying that children exercise little to no agency in 
participating in and creating their culture. As someone 
who had been attracted to such outmoded models 
as Neil Postman’s The Disappearance of Childhood 
in my earliest critical work in the 1980s, I soon 
turned a critical eye on notions that valued children’s 
separateness from adults—and on ones that viewed 
childhood as something under siege—to models that 
focus on children as capable actors. This turn in my 
own thinking was furthered by my participation in the 
late Gareth Matthews’s summer seminar on “Issues in 
the Philosophy of Childhood,” hosted by the National 
Endowment of the Humanities in 1998. While I was 
familiar with Matthews’s books already, participation 
in that seminar solidified my position that assuming 
that children are capable is preferable to thinking 
of them as incapable. While I remained committed 
to constructivist notions of childhood that began 
their ascendancy with Philippe Ariès’s Centuries of 
Childhood, I began to notice that, inflexibly applied, 
those notions had become truisms. Constructivist 
approaches to childhood, of course, have yielded a 
number of insights that have countered notions of 
childhood as “natural” and subject to an adherence 
to narrow models of development, models that were 
usefully interrogated in the seminar. In The Future of 
Childhood, Alan Prout, one of the leading scholars  
of sociology-based childhood studies, notes the 
benefits of “the new social studies of childhood” in 
authorizing scholarly attention to “children’s active 
social participation, their agency in social life and  
their collective life” and in contributing to an  
approach to childhood studies that insists on 
recognizing children “as social actors in their own 
right” (1). While the Western concept of childhood 
arose through “a heightened, dichotomized and 
oppositional relationship between [childhood] and 
adulthood,” Prout argues, “oppositional and binary 
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thinking about children and childhood provides 
an inadequate framework for a contemporary 
understanding of childhood” (10–11). Rather than reify 
the distinctions that have been seen as foundational 
in childhood studies—between the natural and 
the cultural, between being and becoming—Prout 
proposes a both/and approach.
The problem is not that children operate in ways 
that adults and culture script for them. It is clear to me 
that most children’s literature is written by adults; it is 
generally true that, without a notion of childhood as 
somewhat separate from adulthood, there would be 
no separate body of literature for children; I am not so 
foolish as to disregard the fact that adults have much 
more power than children. But I do object to the notion 
that the relationship between adults and children (or 
between adult writers and child readers) is inherently 
oppositional. Without ignoring that there is an 
imbalance of power between children and adults and 
that adults have the upper hand in their relationships 
with children, I agree with Robin Bernstein’s criticism 
of a “top-down understanding of children’s culture,” 
one that insists that it is “created by one empowered 
group (adults) and given to or forced upon another 
disempowered group (children)” (28–29). Children 
are not merely passive recipients of culture; they also 
learn to become active participants in that culture. In 
her essay for this forum, Sara L. Schwebel argues that 
“[h]istorians are left with the object and, as Robin 
Bernstein has argued for dolls, the script—the intended 
usage, the intended meaning.” But in Bernstein’s view, 
the intended usage or meaning is not all we are left 
with; children are “experts in the scripts of children’s 
culture . . . virtuoso performers” of childhood. The 
meanings of their performances, Bernstein writes, 
“cannot be easily contained or controlled”: “Children 
do not passively receive culture. Rather, children 
expertly field the co-scripts of narratives and material 
culture and then collectively forge a third prompt: 
play itself. The three prompts then entangle to script 
future play, which continues to change as children 
collectively exercise agency” (29).
At this point, it seems necessary for me to define 
just what I mean when I talk about children’s agency. I 
decidedly do not subscribe to the idea that Nodelman 
ascribes to me in his essay “Discovery: My Name 
Is Elizabeth”: “The idea that children inherently 
and always possess the agency to do more than just 
improvise within the framework the adults in charge 
provides [sic] represents a kind of wish-fulfillment 
fantasy, a willed belief that children can and do resist 
the impositions of adult culture upon them more than 
we might suspect—that childhood is blissfully free from 
culture” (52). To say that children “exercise agency” 
either collectively or individually is not the same as 
saying they are free from the influence of culture or the 
influence of adults. While “agency” implies the ability 
to act, it is not synonymous with autonomy. Children’s 
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actions, however, are not necessarily confined to the framework adults 
provide; children’s frameworks often extend beyond the ones provided 
by adults in charge, including, for instance, their interaction with 
material objects and other children.
In my review essay entitled “Ambivalent, Double, Divided: Reading 
and Rereading Perry Nodelman,” I suggest that “Nodelman’s insistence 
on the child/adult relationship as inherently binary and inherently 
oppositional precludes or at least obscures” the ways in which 
adults may help children learn to negotiate and even collaborate in 
making children’s texts and culture, rather than impose culture on 
them (142–43). Two years after writing this essay, I read the essay 
Perry sent me and nodded in agreement as I saw him clarifying his 
position by arguing that “positive acts of education” have perhaps 
been underestimated in a critical climate that views the construction of 
childhood in children’s literature primarily in terms of “negative acts of 
repression” (“Discovery” 52).
So, I was taken aback when, near the conclusion of his essay, I 
found myself numbered among the “[m]any scholars [who] would 
like to believe [contrary to Jacqueline Rose] that the child might 
not be grasped at all—that children’s literature is primarily benign 
because children can resist its efforts to grasp them” (52),2 after which 
Nodelman quotes from my contribution to Keywords for Children’s 
Literature: “Children are also capable of creatively misappropriating 
the cultural artifacts they inherit from adults and transforming them 
into their own texts. . . . [T]here are increasing numbers of scholars 
who respect children’s subjectivities and take them seriously” (66). 
Returning to the essay from which my words had been quoted 
selectively prompted me to ask myself some questions. Had I really 
said that? Had I characterized children’s literature as “primarily 
. . . the notion that 
children may be active 
participants in helping 
to shape their culture 
does not underestimate 
the power that adult and 
institutional discourses 
have in shaping children’s 
culture . . . .
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benign”? Had I really “assume[d] that children 
generally have built-in defenses against adult efforts to 
construct them”? Had I forgotten “the extent to which 
the children who ‘misappropriate’ texts are already 
shaped by their previous reading, by the language and 
culture that has already shaped or grasped them”? I did 
not insist that “children inherently and always possess 
the agency to do more than just improvise within the 
framework the adults in charge provide[].” Nor did I 
suggest that resistance was “somehow naturally present 
as a fact of being young.” I do not see any of the 
scholars mentioned in these recent essays maintaining 
“that childhood is blissfully free from culture” (52).3
In the short essay from which Nodelman was 
quoting, my entry on “Culture” in Keywords for 
Children’s Literature, I noted that, “[e]ven when we 
grant children some agency in the creation of their  
own culture, that creation usually takes place under 
adult supervision” (62). Nodelman’s omissions in 
quoting my essay are telling. Here is my concluding 
paragraph in full:
As an object of study, then, children’s culture 
is both shaped and contested by a host of adult 
institutions, ranging in the academy from scholars 
in literature and education to those in media 
studies and social history. Culture is, of course, 
also created by children—if they are interpellated 
by adult ideologies, they are nevertheless also 
capable of resistance and action. Children are also 
capable of creatively misappropriating the cultural 
artifacts they inherit from adults and transforming 
them into their own texts—as anyone who has 
paid attention to children playing knows. If the 
study of children’s culture often appears to be the 
province of adult, experience-distant field workers 
(to borrow the language of ethnography), there 
are increasing numbers of scholars who respect 
children’s subjectivities and take them seriously. The 
traditional gatekeepers of Culture have begun to 
pay more attention to culture, and to acknowledge 
children’s agency in helping to make that culture. 
Nevertheless, as with the climate, cultural change 
occurs more rapidly than we expect, requiring 
scholars to try to become allies rather than 
gatekeepers, if we hope to keep up. (66)
In other words, the notion that children may be 
active participants in helping to shape their culture 
does not underestimate the power that adult and 
institutional discourses have in shaping children’s 
culture and, indeed, the academic field we call 
“children’s literature and culture.” Neither does the 
essay dismiss out of hand Jacqueline Rose’s “attention 
to poststructuralist discourses of power”; indeed, it 
lauds her “sophisticated Freudianism [that] expose[d] 
the tepid psychoanalytic approaches that had long 
dominated the field” and notes “the positive effect” it 
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had “in deepening our understanding of children, their 
literature, and their culture, as well as lending rigor to 
children’s (or childhood) studies” (65).
What I did suggest in the essay was that Althusserian, 
Foucauldian, and other poststructuralist discourses of 
power “today seem overused to the point that they 
risk becoming clichés” (65). In the hands of critics less 
nuanced than Nodelman, these discourses also authorize 
a view of children as victims who are utterly without 
agency, as both Gubar (Artful 32) and David Rudd (30) 
have argued. As I noted in a review of a book by one 
such critic, by discounting the possibility of relational 
subjectivity, they tell “a ‘story’ of childhood—and 
children’s literature and culture—in which the child is 
represented almost exclusively as a victim” (Review 435).
As I insisted in that same review, “children do 
things with texts” (435; emphasis in original). Indeed, 
many children make texts of their own even before 
they are old enough to read. Does this mean that they 
naturally do this “as a fact of being young” (Nodelman, 
“Discovery” 52)? No. But they have the capacity for 
doing so by virtue of being human. Potential, of course, 
is not achievement. Nevertheless, while Nodelman’s 
granddaughter Elizabeth may be “too new to know that 
she is new,” may “exist . . . outside adult assumptions 
about the world [adults] understand [her] to be 
discovering,” she is not so “radically dissimilar,” to 
borrow Gubar’s phrase, that she cannot communicate 
or interact with her adult caregivers. In proposing the 
kinship model for children’s literature studies, Gubar 
argues that “we should not regard even the tiniest infant 
as entirely voiceless or non-agential” (“Risky” 453). She 
is fully cognizant of the fact that “human beings are not 
born with the ability to take care of themselves, to speak 
articulately on their own behalf” (453–54).
Advancing a model of children’s agency that focuses 
on children’s capabilities rather than their deficiencies 
does not mean ignoring or dismissing “culturally 
powerful adult ideas about childhood” (Nodelman, 
“Disappearing” 158), nor does it mean denying the 
immense power that social, historical, and ideological 
constructions have in shaping children’s—or, for that 
matter, adults’—subjectivities. What it does mean is 
that neither human beings nor texts are so thoroughly 
constructed by our dominant ideologies that no 
conscious or deliberate thought or action on the part 
of the person, the writer, or the reader is possible. 
This is not the same thing as “blinding ourselves 
to the repressive potential of texts” (Nodelman, 
“Disappearing” 158). Clare Bradford, for instance, 
argues that we should reject as fallacious the argument 
that the racism of “older texts” is merely a product of the 
times in which the texts were produced. “For despite the 
potency of what Michel Foucault refers to as a ‘régime 
of truth,’” Bradford continues,
the “system of ordered procedures for the 
production, regulation, distribution, circulation 
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and operation of statements” . . . whereby societies 
control and order what is deemed to be true, it is 
also the case that individuals and groups are not 
bound by dominant discourses as by a straitjacket 
but are capable of scepticism or resistance. For this 
reason, texts sharing a common provenance are 
liable to differ widely in relation to the thematics, 
representational modes and discursive features 
which characterize their treatment of race. (39–40)4
Linking Bradford with me and Gubar (and quoting all 
three selectively), Nodelman mis-characterizes all these 
critics’ positions as “imply[ing] that children’s literature 
itself might be more benign than it often actually is” 
(“Disappearing” 158). To insist that we “are not bound 
by dominant discourses as by a straitjacket but are 
capable of scepticism or resistance” (Bradford 40) or 
to observe that, while children “are interpellated by 
adult ideologies, they are nevertheless also capable 
of resistance and action” (Flynn, “Culture” 66) is not 
tantamount to “insist[ing] that the literature is not 
actually repressive” (Nodelman, “Disappearing” 158). 
Similarly, Gubar explicitly rejects the idea of calling 
for “a simple binary reversal” of accounts of children’s 
literature that imply that it oppresses children; her 
interest lies in justifying further inquiry about what 
effects particular texts have had on particular children 
despite the fact that any such inquiry is attended by 
“thorny epistemological problems” (Artful 32, 33).
Nodelman began formulating his argument that the 
relationship between adults and children is essentially 
oppositional in his influential and controversial 1992 
essay “The Other: Orientalism, Colonialism, and 
Children’s Literature.” At the heart of this essay is his 
laudable desire to intervene in common yet dangerous 
and contradictory assumptions about children, as well 
as the ways in which our unquestioned acceptance of 
these assumptions helps them become “self-confirming 
description[s]” or part of a “self-fulfilling prophecy” (32). 
For instance, Nodelman writes,
If we assume children have short attention spans 
and therefore never let them try to read long books, 
they do not in fact read long books. They will seem 
to us to be incapable of reading long books—and 
we will see those that [sic] do manage to transcend 
our influence and read long books as atypical, 
paradoxically freaks in being more like us than 
like our other. It may well be for this reason that a 
depressingly large number of children do seem to fit 
into Piagetian categorizations of childlike behavior, 
and that an equally large number of children do 
seem to like the kinds of books that adult experts 
claim to be the kind of books children like. (32)
Criticizing these assumptions and the “oppressiveness 
inherent in our use of concepts such as ‘the eternal 
innocence of childhood,’” Nodelman calls for us to 
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“try to operate as if the humanity children share with us matters more 
than their presumed differences from us” (34). In this essay, in The 
Pleasures of Children’s Literature, and somewhat less so in The Hidden 
Adult, Nodelman is quite critical of the assumptions of developmental 
psychology that perpetuate what Matthews calls the “deficit conception” 
of childhood. Nodelman here seems to be arguing for something close 
to what Gubar is calling for when she proposes that we look at the 
differences between adults and children as “differences of degree, 
not of kind” (“Risky” 454). In Pleasures, Nodelman and his co-author, 
Mavis Reimer, argue that the dangerous and limiting adult assumptions 
about childhood arise from suspect notions about children’s alterity that 
“operate on the principle that children are not only different, but also 
opposite to [adults]” (95). Nodelman and Reimer seem quite sympathetic 
to critiques by Matthews and others of the self-fulfilling prophecy 
inherent in a Piagetian model that insists on seeing children as limited 
rather than capable. In a section entitled “Beyond the Child as Other,” 
they write:
If the idea that children are limited or even empty is ideological, then 
it need not be the only possible truth, or the truth people need to 
accept. There is the choice of thinking about children in other, more 
positive ways, and creating a different and, we believe, better truth. 
Specifically, it might be productive to focus on the ways in which 
children are like adults rather than opposite to them. (98)
Recognizing that “this, too, is ideology” (99), they nevertheless point out 
that a view of children that assumes their capability “is much more likely 
than the usual assumptions to allow adults to help children learn ways 
of reading and of thinking about what they read that might give them 
What are we talking 
about when we talk 
about children’s agency?
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deeper and more satisfying pleasure and understanding” 
(99). Since he is on record here as preferring a model 
of children’s capability to one that emphasizes their 
limitations, it has puzzled me that, in his recent 
criticism, Nodelman has placed less emphasis on the 
humanity children share with adults, emphasizing 
instead their presumed differences—often in stark 
terms. Nevertheless, it seems to me that, in the course 
of our writing, revising, clarifying, and revising again 
our papers for this forum, we have found more areas of 
agreement than we had when we began this project.
The interrogation of “Common Assumptions about 
Childhood” in Pleasures has inspired me during my 
scholarly career, particularly as it has applied to my 
exploration of agency in cross-writing by poets such as 
June Jordan and Gwendolyn Brooks, and their insistence 
(in the words of U. C. Knoepflmacher and Mitzi Myers) 
on “a dialogic mix of older and younger voices . . . in 
texts too often read as univocal” (vii). Jordan and Brooks, 
writers who fought throughout their careers for children’s 
rights and children’s agency, rejected regressive tropes 
that would relegate young people to victim status. And 
they did so by interrogating—and teaching young people 
to interrogate—the powerful racist assumptions of mid-
twentieth-century United States.5
Branches of childhood studies that involve 
research with actual children are careful to delineate 
the complexity of what anthropologist Allison James 
calls in the subtitle to her 2007 essay, “Giving Voice 
to Children,” the “Practices and Problems, Pitfalls 
and Potentials” of a “key theoretical tension within 
the field of childhood studies . . . the relationship 
between ‘childhood’ as a social space, ‘children’ as 
a generational category, and ‘the child’ as individual 
representative of that category and inhabitant of that 
space” (270). This definition of “the child” as individual 
representative rejects the universalizing gestures of “the 
Western mythologizing of ‘the child’” (265). Exploring 
“the cultural politics of childhood that shapes children’s 
everyday lives and experiences,” James recognizes 
that childhood is “a social space that is structurally 
determined by a range of social institutions,” that, 
“because of this, children as subjects are . . . structurally 
and culturally determined as social actors with specific 
social roles to play, as children,” but also that “children 
also ‘shape those roles, both as individuals and as a 
collectivity, and [that] they can create new ones that 
alter the social space of childhood’ itself” (270).6
What are we talking about when we talk about 
children’s agency? In my view, we are talking about 
paying attention to children’s competence and capability 
as social actors and about challenging what James 
calls “the more traditional, developmental discourse of 
children’s incompetence” (266). This includes looking 
at the life course as a continuum—there are, after all, 
both adults and children of varying ages, competencies, 
and capabilities—and recognizing the intersection of 
the natural and the cultural and of modes of being and 
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Notes
 1 I point especially to my Keywords in Children’s Literature entry 
on “Culture.” What I perceive to be Nodelman’s misrepresentation 
of that essay initiated the correspondence that evolved into this 
forum. For an elaboration of what Rita Felski terms “the limits of 
critique,” see Felski, Uses; Felski, Limits.
 2 As far as I can tell in terms of the books mentioned in this piece 
by Nodelman, only Peter Hunt in The Oxford Handbook identifies 
himself as a critic who “prefer[s] to see the project of children’s 
literature as essentially benign” (45).
 3 Here is the relevant passage:
  Assuming that children generally have built-in defenses  
  against adult efforts to construct them seem [sic] to me  
  much less respectful. What comments like this one of Flynn’s  
  most significantly forget is the extent to which the children who  
  “misappropriate” texts are already shaped by their previous  
  reading, by the language and culture that has already shaped  
  or grasped them—often, literally, for their good, as when an  
  adult teaches them the kind of critical thinking that arms them  
  against grasping texts, that is, constructs them into  
  misappropriating readers. The idea that children inherently and  
becoming that persist throughout our lives. Not only do 
adults form intersubjective relationships with children, 
but also they have an intra-subjective relationship with 
childhood, so that, as Gubar puts it, “our younger and 
older selves are multiple and interlinked, akin to one 
another, rather than wholly distinct” (“Risky” 454). This 
is far from engaging in a “wish-fulfillment fantasy” that 
children “inherently and always” possess unlimited 
agency (Nodelman, “Discovery” 52); children do 
not possess unlimited agency any more than adults 
do. Thinking of children as capable might help us 
criticize or intervene in dismantling the binary logic 
that Nodelman notes is characteristic of “all adult 
thinking about children in the centuries in which a 
special children’s literature has existed” (Hidden 209). 
Without denying the power and longevity of the model 
that “understand[s] . . . childhood purely in terms of its 
opposition to, lack of, and subordination to maturity” 
(Hidden 209), I maintain that it is not hopelessly utopian 
to suggest that a model that assumes competency, that 
promotes an ethic of care and cooperation, and that 
recognizes young people as co-producers and co-
performers rather than passive recipients of texts might 
further the goal of young people’s empowerment more 
than one that sees the perpetuation of the oppositional 
model as inevitable.
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